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The evolution of Internet has brought browsers, which can be compared to op-
erating systems. Users are allowed to run multiple tasks simultaneously and
therefore the browser must control the memory management and schedul-
ing. Additionally, the browser must assure that the computer and the user’s
information is not compromised. Thus, the browsers applies constraints to
the web content. A web content that is rendered inside the browser should
not have access to the hard drive and should not have access to modify the
way other web pages are being rendered. The focus of the browsers secu-
rity features has been on restricting web content’s rights. This should have
changed as browser extensions were introduced. Now, three most popular
web browsers include the possibility to extend their functionalities. Internet
Explorer, Google Chrome and Firefox allow users to install binary extensions
and these extensions have access to the hard drive. The new threat posed
by the extensions is not widely acknowledged.
In this work, we analyse the security models of browser extensions. We
view the extension models of Mozilla Firefox 3.6, Internet Explorer 8 and
Google Chrome 5.0.360. Because browsers are providing functionalities sim-
ilar to operating systems, we analyse these extension models as we would
analyse an operating system. We show that the current security models can
be abused with little effort. A browser with a compromised extension may
result in the whole computer being compromised. To support our claims, we
tested most of the attacks that are described in this analysis. The source code
of these attacks is not included in the thesis. Thus, due to previously men-
tioned risks, we want to stress the importance of the threat that extensions
pose to the security of browsers.
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The thesis is divided into three parts. The first part describes Mozilla
Firefox’s security model, the second part contains analysis of Google Chrome’s
extension model and the third part describes Internet Explorer’s security
model. Each browser’s analysis starts with the description of the extension
model. Then we present the weaknesses of current model and show ways of
compromising it. The feasibility of creating malware extensions is analysed
for each browser individually. Based on the analysis we propose possible
attack vectors for each browser. Finally, we suggest ways to improve the




Mozilla Firefox is a free open source browser. Mozilla project was started in
January 1998, when Netscape publicly released the source code of Netscape
Communicator 4.0. With the launch of the Mozilla project, a new cross-
platform layout engine named Gecko was released. The Mozilla Firefox
project was created as an experimental branch of the Mozilla project. In
2003 Mozilla Foundation was established in order to continue the work on the
Mozilla project. In November 2004, Firefox 1.0 was released. The browser
was built on Gecko 1.7, a successor to the layout engine that was created
by Netscape Communications Corporation. Since then the popularity of the
browser has grown and as of March 2010 Firefox holds 24.52% of web browsers
market share according to Net Applications [BMS]. The company monitors a
network of 40000 web sites over the world and the results are based on an ap-
proximate of 160 million unique visitors per month. Because of the browser’s
modular architecture, it is possible to extend its functionalities and that can
weaken the security architecture of the browser.
1.1 Overview of the extensions
Add-ons are software components that the user can add to Firefox. They are
divided into themes, extensions and plugins. Add-ons are created by third-
party developers who use Firefox’s extension framework to add functionality
to the browser. Themes change the visual appearance of the user interface.
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Plugins are native code libraries, which are used to provide the user with
external functionalities. Thus, plugins are binary applications that run inside
the browser’s memory. Extensions differ from plugins as they extend or
modify the browser’s functionalities and also need only one set of privileges.
Extensions can be written in JavaScript or C++ and they are able to use
the XPCOM API [TO].
Figure 1.1: Extensions and plugins relation with Gecko.
Browser’s high level architecture is depicted in Figure 1.1. Extensions
can access the Gecko engine, which is a cross-platform layout engine. Access
to the engine is provided through a middle layer named XPConnect, which
allows JavaScript to interfere with Cross Platform Component Object Model
(XPCOM).
The component object model makes the resources of Gecko available as
a series of components, or reusable cross-platform libraries, which can be
accessed from the web browser or extension [XPCb]. The functionality of the
browser is defined in XPCOM components and accessed by means of those
component interfaces. For example the various XPCOM components provide
the functionality for navigation, window management, managing cookies,
bookmarks, security, searching, rendering, and other features [TO]. Since
the XPCOM components are written in C or C++, an additional bridging
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layer is needed to enable the other programming languages to access these
components, see Figure 1.2. Applications that want to access the XPCOM
components (Network, DOM, Security, etc.) use a special language binding
layer of XPCOM called XPConnect, that reflects the library interfaces into
JavaScript. Other language bindings exist for Python (PyXPCOM), Java
(JavaXPCOM) and bindings for Perl and Ruby is being developed [Bin].
Figure 1.2: The XPCOM components are scriptable and JavaScript can ac-
cess these components via XPConnect.
Firefox extensions can be divided into two: binary extensions and exten-
sions that are based on XUL(XML User Interface Language) and JavaScript.
The new functionalities are applied by overloading the browser’s code at
startup or by adding additional binary components to the browser. Exten-
sions that have been installed on Firefox have full browser privileges. An ex-
tension has the rights to read, write and execute files on the user’s computer.
This means that if an attacker can exploit a vulnerability in an extension
then he may get the control over the browser. An attacker may also create
a malicious extension and trick the user install it.
1.2 Security architecture
Firefox uses single process memory model. All the windows, tabs, plugins and
extensions run inside the same process. Threads that run inside the process
share the address space and thus there are no borders between threads.
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1.2.1 Firefox’s memory space and threads
Threads allow multiple executions to take place in the same process envi-
ronment, so that they are to a large degree independent of one another.
Having multiple threads running in parallel in one process is analogous to
having multiple processes running in parallel in a computer. However, the
separation of threads is weaker than the separation of processes.
Threads inside a process are not as independent as different processes
running in an operating system. All threads use the same address space,
which means that they also share the same global variables. Thus, a thread
can access every memory address within the process’s address space, see
Figure 1.3. Every thread is able to read, write, or even wipe out another
thread’s stack. Different processes may have different owners and run with
lower or higher privileges and therefore a process needs to be protected from
other processes. Contrary to processes, a thread does not need protection
from other threads as threads run with the same privileges and have a single
owner. Thus, there is no protection between threads. Therefore, in addition
to sharing an address space, all the threads share the same set of open files,
child processes, alarms, and signals, etc [Tan01]. For further details we refer
to the handbook [Tan01].
Figure 1.3: All threads inside a process share the same memory space, there-
fore a thread can access another thread’s stack.
To summarise, a thread inside the Firefox process is able to read and
write to the memory addresses outside of the thread’s memory. Because of
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that, it is possible to make an extension that is able to read and modify the
memory of another extension. The developers have tried to create borders
between threads because of the thread safety issues. This is done in the API
level, for example, calling the plug-in API is supported only from the main
thread. Background threads are not allowed to modify the main thread, re-
quests that wish to modify the user interface are handed to the main thread.
This is implemented to protect the browser from crashing [Thr]. It is possible
to use a XPCOM component to have a call execute in another thread, but
this can lead to a crash [Tur].
Despite that there are some borders between threads, extensions can use
all the APIs the browser can. If an exension runs in a background thread,
then it can pass the request to the main thread. Thus extensions can do
everything the browser does. Therefore, the current memory system does
not separate extensions nor provides a way to handle privilege management.
UC Berkeley security group examined the extensions privilege management
in the API level [Fel09]. They examined the use of APIs in 25 extensions
recommended by Mozilla. After examining the behavior of the extensions,
they determined that only 3 of the 25 extensions actually needed access
to the most powerful capabilities of the Firefox extension system. Then
they compared extension behavior to the interfaces used to implement it
and found a privilege gap between the desired functionality and the actual
interfaces [Fel09]. This shows that by the current model extensions have
higher privileges than are required for their functionalities.
With the current APIs, reducing the privileges of extensions in the Firefox
extensions system is difficult because the functionalities needed for an exten-
sion are accessed through interfaces that give access to different privileges
[BFSB09]. For example, Firefox does not have a low privilege file storage in-
terface and thus extensions use a file system interface, which grants read and
write access to arbitrary files. Also, an extension that stores its preferences
using a preference service is able to modify the preferences of the browser




As Firefox is a multitasking system it owns a scheduler, that provides avail-
able processing time to the browser’s tasks. Local threads are scheduled
within a process only and are handled entirely by The Netscape Portable
Runtime (NSPR) API. Firefox also supports global threads, that are sched-
uled by the host OS and correspond to native threads on the host OS.
NSPR threads are scheduled by priority and can be preempted or inter-
rupted. These threads are interruptible, with some constraints and incon-
sistencies. To interrupt a thread, the caller of PR Interrupt must have the
NSPR reference to the target thread. PR Interrupt requests that a thread
would stop performing its task and return to a control point. When a thread
is interrupted, it is rescheduled from the point at which it was blocked. A
thread may be interrupted only if it is waiting on a condition variable or
waiting on I/O. In the latter case, interruption does cancel the I/O op-
eration. In neither case, when a thread interrupted, it is not terminated
[NSPa]. A thread can be shut down by calling its shutdown method from
another thread. This stops events from being dispatched to the thread, but
any pending events will run to completion [nsI].
For the implementation of NSPR, different strategies are used on different
platforms. On some platforms the NSPR threads map directly to the native
threads on the platform, while on others NSPR supports both threads that
are scheduled by NSPR and the native threads. NSPR version 4.8.3 uses
pthreads library on all Unix platforms and on Windows platforms NSPR
multiplexes user-level threads on top of native, kernel-level threads. This
model is also called a combined MxN model, with Windows threads and
fibers [NSPb]. It means that there are many local threads inside a Windows
thread and these local threads are scheduled by NSPR.
To summarize, the scheduling is not done by the operating system and if
Firefox gets compromised, then also the scheduler gets compromised. Thus,
if a malicious extension is installed, then it is able to control the execution
of a random thread inside the Firefox process.
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1.2.3 Firefox’s code space
By default the contents of Firefox’s installation folder can be modified only
with administrative rights. This folder contains the browser’s source files
and globally installed extensions and plugins. User profile files are located in
a folder that is accessible without administrative privileges, see Figure 1.4.
This folder contains user’s bookmarks, preferences, passwords, extensions,
etc.
Most of the browser’s functionality is made available through the use of
XPCOM components. The official way to add additional XPCOM compo-
nents to the browser is to create an extension with the components inside
a components directory. With this approach the user will be notified about
the modifications and will be able to disable the component from the exten-
sions manager. Also, old components will not be installed on newer Firefox
versions if the extension is not compatible with the newer Firefox’s version.
Firefox’s code space in most part is not protected from modifications.
It is possible to modify the user interface files, the configuration files and
extension files. Before Firefox 3.6 it was possible to add binary components
to Firefox’s components directory and these components were automatically
loaded at startup. This was a security issue as these new components were
invisible to the users [Nig]. There was also a problem with Firefox crashing
after an update from version 3.0 to 3.5 because the old binary components
were not compatible with the new version.
This was somewhat fixed by adding a whitelist of approved components,
that the browser is allowed to load automatically. The whitelist is imple-
mented as a text file, containing the names of the allowed binary compo-
nents. Each time the browser is updated, a new components list is created,
which negates any unallowed changes in the file. It should not be possible to
load components that are not in the whitelist, because it is a security risk.
The current implementation of the whitelist allows a third party program to
add binary components to Firefox the same way as it was done before. It is
possible because the whitelist is not protected from modifications.
To test this hypothesis we created a new binary component and tested the
functionality of the whitelist’s implementation by adding a new component
to the current whitelist. We saw that the current whitelist does not provide
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additional security as it is possible to force the browser to load the new
component at startup.
To carry out this attack, a third party program must be installed on
the computer that carries out the component installation. The program
must have read and write access to the Firefox’s installation directory, which
means that administrative privileges are required. This is required to modify
the whitelist and to register the new component after the whitelist has been
changed. Firefox is forced to check for new components when it starts if
its .autoreg file is modified. We added our component to the whitelist and
then we modified the autoreg file to force Firefox to scan the whitelist. Using
these steps we were able to quietly load our new binary component the next
time the browser started. We also found out that all new components are
whitelisted if the file containing the whitelist is removed from the components
directory.
Figure 1.4: The overview of Firefox’s code space.
These security risks could be abused to compromise the browser in a
manner that the user would not notice. There is little that the user could do
against the silent component installation because most users will not check,
which binary components are installed. If a threat abusing the current model
gets popular, then it is possible to block it. The developers of Firefox have
created blacklist of components that the browser cannot load. The blacklist
is renewed with every browser update. With this approach it is possible to
add malware components to the blacklist of the next update, which would
break the malware. This approach can be avoided by the malware if it dis-
ables the updating of the blacklist. Thus, the method is effective only in
preventing the installation of malware components.
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The files of extensions, plugins and preferences are not protected and can
be overwritten by the user. This means that a third party application is able
to modify the functionality of the browser. For example, it is possible to
change the functionality of the extension by modifying its source files. Thus,
a user cannot be sure that the installed extensions function the same way
they did after their installation. This can lead to an information leak if a
compromised component is placed on the user’s computer or if an existing
extension’s functionalities are modified.
1.2.4 Update system
Before Gecko 1.9 (before Firefox 3), the extension update system was par-
tially vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack. Man-in-the-middle attack
allows an attacker to listen the traffic between the user and the server and
intercept it. For example, this attack could be done by hijacking a public
Wi-Fi network, because the connection between the computer and the pub-
lic Wi-Fi router is usually not encrypted and thus unsafe. Therefore, the
attacker may be able to impersonate a server and send false information to
the user. The vulnerability of the update system was possible because the
updates were sometimes delivered via an insecure protocol, without using
further security measures. This allowed an attacker to intercept traffic in
a public Wi-Fi hotspot and interfere with the update process. Gecko 1.9
introduced security measures to solve the problem. Now, every extension
that uses an insecure protocol for updating, must have a digital signature in
the update manifest. If such an extension does not have a digital signature,
then Firefox will not check for updates for that extension. Also, a https page
must use a valid signature for the update process to succeed. To verify the
integrity of the downloaded extension, the update must be hashed. More
specifically, the update information is hashed using a SHA-512 hashing al-
gorithm and the hash is digitally signed with the extension creator’s private
key [HAS]. These security measures will prevent an attacker from succeeding
in a man-in-the-middle attack against the update process.
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1.2.5 JavaScript sandboxing
By current design, JavaScript that is used in an extension has the same
privileges as the extension. This could lead to a security breach, as privileged
JavaScript may interact with a hostile web page. A hostile web page might
use the design flaws of an extension and inject malicious code to the web page,
which could result in running the attacker’s code on the user’s computer.
Therefore, it is advised to sandbox the JavaScript that the extension injects
into web pages.
Applications and extensions that inject JavaScript to the DOM of un-
trusted (web page) content need to be secured against hostile web sites.
As a web site’s DOM might contain malicious content, the extensions must
make sure that the information that they use is really coming from the
DOM API and not from JavaScript properties, getter functions, and set-
ter functions defined by a malicious page [Saf]. Since Firefox 1.5, an API
(Components.utils.Sandbox) exists to evaluate JavaScript code with re-
stricted privileges. Code that is running in this sandbox will always execute
with restricted privileges, as on a normal web page [eva]. Still, privileged
JavaScript has to access some parts of unprivileged web content. By cre-
ating a sandbox and then loading a document into an XPCNativeWrapper
within the sandbox, an area can be made, in which JavaScript has restricted
privileges. XPCNativeWrapper is a way to wrap up an object, so that it’s
safe to access it from privileged code. It limits access to the properties and
methods of the object it wraps, thus preventing a web page from redefining
extension’s methods and properties [XPCa]. Extension that needs to use a
sandbox to run user scripts should create a sandbox area, add a document
to the XPCNativeWrapper, load JavaScript from local files (or generate it)
and finally use evalInSandbox() to run that code on the document. To use
evalInSandbox(), first a sandbox object must be created using its construc-
tor, Components.utils.Sandbox. The sandbox must be initialized with an
origin URI, a DOM window or a nsIPrincipal object. Manually creating
XPCNativeWrapper objects by using its constructor is necessary only if the
extension is designed to work on versions prior to Firefox 1.5. Newer Firefox
versions automatically wrap privileged JavaScript whenever it accesses less
privileged objects. The code that runs using evalInSandbox() will be able
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to call API functions, so it must be protected from JavaScript running in the
original web page: for this reason many functions in the sandbox are unavail-
able [eva]. This kind of sandbox allows an extension to access certain parts
of the hostile environment like DOM, but it does not allow malicious scripts
to interfere with privileged scripts or intercept references to privileged func-
tions. However, security problems may arise when using evalInSandbox().
It may not be safe to use properties of the objects that are executed in the
sandbox. Also, it is not safe to call privileged functions from within the
sandbox.
1.2.6 Blocklisting extensions
Firefox has a built-in security feature, that should protect the users from
installing compromised plugins and extensions. A blocklist of extensions and
plugins has been created. This list should contain all known extensions and
plugins that are vulnerable to an attack or that have been created by attack-
ers. The list is updated daily and if a match is found, then the extension or
plugin will be disabled and the user will be notified about the threat. This
approach can protect the users from installing widely known threats and inse-
cure extensions, but it does not provide any protection after an extension has
been installed because the extension can disable this feature. Thus, if a com-
promised extension is installed, it can guarantee that no new blocklists will
be downloaded. The compromised extension can modify the preferences file
in the user’s profile folder and set extensions.blocklist.enabled=false
[Blo]. Additionally, an extension is able to modify the blocklist.xml file
and can allow dangerous extensions or plugins to be installed. The exten-
sions should not have the right to disable this feature in order for it to be
successful and provide protection against malware.
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1.3 Attack scenarios
1.3.1 Creating a keylogger
An extension can be used as a keylogger. It is fairly simple to write a few
lines of JavaScript that logs every keystroke on the browser window or in
dialog boxes. Using XMLHttpRequest it is possible to send the collected
data to a listening server. What makes this dangerous is the simplicity to
implement it. It is not required to create or to install a new extension to add
the keylogger to the browser. An attacker or a third party software that is
able to modify the installed extensions can add additional functionality to
already installed extensions and thus compromise them. This is dangerous
as the user will not be able to detect the change, extensions will not loose
their functionality and no new extensions appear in the extensions manager.
Besides compromising the browser, it is possible to compromise the whole
computer. Firefox’s extensions are not sandboxed, they have privileges to
write to the hard drive and to read from the hard drive. An extension can
contain a binary component that is able to listen to every keystroke made
when the browser is running.
We tested if it would be possible to add a binary file to an already existing
extension and it was. A third party application or an attacker can add binary
files to already installed extensions without leaving a trace to the user. This
is possible as by the current model extensions load all binary files that are
included in their components folder. An attacker who is using these meth-
ods can probably collect information about the user without getting noticed.
Using virtual keyboard will not protect the user from these keyloggers as
the keystrokes are intercepted from the browser. The keylogger does not use
operation system APIs to hook itself to other programs, it is based only on
JavaScript. Thus, firewalls or antivirus programs will not detect this keylog-
ger because it is a simple JavaScript extension that has become a part of the
browsers functionality and runs inside the browser’s process. Therefore, if
Firefox is not blocked by the firewall, then the keylogger is also not blocked,
as they use the same port. The keylogger script that is part of the extension
cannot be distinguished from safe extensions, as an extension is allowed to
use JavaScript and send information to a remote server.
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1.3.2 Website defacement
While browsing a web page, users believe that the content they see is au-
thentic. This is why attackers would like to modify the content of web pages.
An attacker could alter the information displayed or change the behavior
of the web site and users would likely not notice the difference. In Firefox
it is possible to change the way a web page is being displayed while it is
being loaded. JavaScript with a specific event listener is enough to change
the content of a web page being displayed. DOMContentLoaded is the event
listener that could be used. Fired on a Window object when a document’s
DOM content is finished loading, but unlike “load”, does not wait until all
images are loaded [Gec].
Figure 1.5: This scheme shows how a web page is being loaded.
We made an extension to test if we could use these methods for changing
the way an https page is being displayed. We wanted to test, if it would be
possible to add or remove content from an https page. The results revealed
that after the DOM had been loaded, it was possible to modify the content
before it was displayed. The extension was able to both add and remove
content. The result shows that website defacement is achievable and that
Firefox does not guarantee that a verified web page is always being displayed
correctly. This property can be used for creating a man-in-the-browser at-
tack, which is described in the second chapter. Implementing the attack in
Firefox is identical to the one described for Google Chrome.
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1.3.3 Phishing attacks
Phishing is a type of fraud, which tricks users to give away sensitive infor-
mation, for example usernames and passwords. Usually phishing is done by
directing the user to a fake web site, which seems identical to the legitimate
one. This could be used by an attacker for gathering confidential informa-
tion. For example, the attacker could get the login details if the user would
try to log into his account on a fake web page. To be able to trick a user to
think that a web page is secure, it is needed to make him see no difference be-
tween the real page and the fake one. Firefox uses several methods to change
the user interface so that the user sees certain icons or extra information
when using a secure site. Firefox classifies web pages into three categories:
pages with no identity information, pages with basic identity information and
pages with complete identity information. The last two are both encrypted
pages whose domain has been verified, but the latter also has the informa-
tion about the owner of the site. To visualize the categorization, it provides a
colored button on the left side of the address bar since version 3.0, see Figure
1.6. This area is called the site identity button. If the page has no identity
information, then the button is colored grey, when it is verified and uses
encryption but does not have the information about the owner it is colored
blue and when the page has complete identity information it is colored green.
Figure 1.6: It shows how the color of the identity button changes depending
of the available identity information.
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It should not be possible to change the color of the site identity button, as
this is the first thing, which makes the user notice that he is using a secure
site. But using only a few lines of code, it is possible to overlay the site
identity button’s background color to make it look identical to the ones used
on secure sites.
Another security feature is the padlock icon, which is shown on secure
sites. Firefox places the icon on the right side of the status bar. There are
no restrictions on the extensions overlaying the skin of the browser. It is
possible to disable the icon with one line of code and add a false icon with a
few more lines, see Figure 1.7.
Figure 1.7: A padlock image is created on the status bar every time an https
page is being loaded.
1.3.4 Stealing saved passwords
Firefox allows users to save passwords in order to make browsing more com-
fortable. Most users are not aware that these passwords are saved to an
encrypted file on the user’s profile folder and that the file that contains
the keys necessary for decrypting these passwords is inside the same folder.
These files can be copied to a new profile folder on another computer and then
viewed using the browsers password manager. An extension is able to read
the contents of these files and send the information to a remote server and
thereby reveal the saved usernames and passwords to a third party. There
is a way to avoid the leakage of passwords by using a master password. If
the user has set a master password, then the files of passwords and keys are
encrypted with another key. When a master password is used, then it must
be entered every time, when the user wants to use the saved passwords. This
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eliminates the convenience of not entering passwords. For that reason, the
feature of protecting already saved passwords is not widely used. Even if the
user protects his passwords, there is a chance that a compromised extension
is able to read the saved passwords. The compromised extension might read
the keystrokes, find out the master password and send the collected strings
with the encrypted files to a remote server. An extension could also read the
password from the filled forms, that are shown after the master password is
used to access a password protected website. Considering these weaknesses
in the password protection, it is not advised to save passwords. Passwords
that are not protected can be viewed in a few seconds by anyone who is able
to access the computer. Even if the passwords are protected, then there still
remains a threat from the compromised extensions. Disallowing the password
file to be decrypted on other computers would protect the user’s passwords
from being copied. Besides that, Firefox could use the password managers
that are provided by operating systems.
1.3.5 Using Firefox as a botnet
Firefox could be used as a botnet client. Most difficult in creating this kind
of a botnet is installing botnet extensions to thousands of computers. If
this could be done, then the extensions could guide the browser on behalf
of the botnet owner. The extensions could read the instructions from stated
websites. This can be done by using XMLHttpRequest, that queries the con-
tents of a html page without loading it. The received html can be parsed
and instructions can be found. After reading the commands the extension
could start to send spam following the instructions or to start requesting a
certain URL to perform a DoS attack. DoS attack could be done by us-
ing XMLHttpRequest. The website, which is being queried, has to allow
XMLHttpRequests or the results are not returned. If the website does not al-
low XMLHttpRequests, then the requests still go through, making it possible
to clog the website. As the botnet client would run inside the Firefox process,
it would not be found by detecting software. Also, a Firewall would not stop
it because Firefox is allowed to pass it. The botnet client could be optimized
to utilise only a part of the computer’s resources, to remain unnoticed.
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1.3.6 Risk assessment
Considering the threats we classified them by severity ratings provided by
Mozilla.
• Critical - It is possible to run code with user privileges and without the
user’s knowledge.
• High - Access to confidential data and ability to inject data without
the user’s knowledge.
• Moderate - Access to sensitive information that does not expose the
user or organization to immediate risk.
• Low - Leaks of non-sensitive information.
• DoS - Temporary denial of service attacks that may result in the crash
of the application.
Changing the Keylogger Website Phishing Botnet Faulty






1.4 Ways for compromising Firefox
1.4.1 Cross-Site Scripting
Cross-Site Scripting attacks are a type of injection problem, in which ma-
licious scripts are injected into the otherwise benign and trusted web sites.
Cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks occur when an attacker uses a web appli-
cation to send malicious code, generally in the form of a browser side script,
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to a different end user [XSS]. According to the presentation of Roberto Suggi
Liverani and Nick Freeman, any input rendered in the chrome is a potential
XSS injection point [LF]. XSS in chrome is privileged code, so there are no
same origin policy restrictions [LF].
The Firebug extension versions prior to 1.04 had vulnerabilities, which
allowed running arbitrary script code in chrome. Firstly, the input passed
to the console.log() function was not properly sanitised and could have
been exploited to execute arbitrary script code within the “chrome”: con-
text by tricking a user into visiting a malicious website. Secondly, results of
the toString method when processing function objects were not properly
sanitised before being used. This could have been exploited to e.g. exe-
cute arbitrary script code within the “chrome:” context by overriding the
toString method with a specially crafted function [Fir].
This means that some extensions may have security holes, allowing a web
page to inject scripts, which could alter the behavior of another web site.
Usually cross-site scripting is restricted by the same origin policy, which
does not allow a script to access the methods and properties of a different
site, but the code loaded from chrome is privileged with no restrictions on
XSS. Because Firefox’s extensions do not run inside a sandbox, it is possible
that an insecure extension could allow an attacker to take control over the
whole computer.
1.4.2 Installing a compromised extension
A third party software or a trusted person is able to install extensions. For
example, the cleaning staff or computer repair team may have access to the
browser. The extension that is installed may camouflage itself and behave as
a well known extension. Very few of the extensions are currently signed, the
user is not able to verify the origin of the installed extension. As a result of
limited identity information the change may stay undetected.
1.4.3 Modifying the installed extensions
We have demonstrated that is possible to modify the functionalities of in-
stalled extensions. An attacker using this property can hide the malware’s
23
code inside the existing extensions. A third party software intended to com-
promise the extensions could be used. The user might detect the third party
software and remove it, but probably would not detect the change in the ex-
tensions directory. Such an attack vector would compromise the computer,
mislead the user and leave the threat undetected. As the malware has become
a part of the browser, the detection programs will not find the infection.
1.5 Solutions
The easiest solution for these problems is to use the browser in safe mode.
Namely, when Firefox is started in safe mode, it disables all extensions and
thus there is no threat from the extensions. But that approach would destroy
the current functionalities provided by the extensions. This solution would
provide security only to a fraction of users, as most are not aware of the
threats posed by extensions.
If leaving aside the safe mode, the current extension model needs to be
made safer. The survey of Firefox extension API use by Adrienne Porter Felt
showed that extensions use too powerful APIs [Fel09]. These APIs provide
access to file system and the possibility to execute files. This kind of behavior
is required by a minority of extensions. Thus, the extensions have access to
the APIs, which they do not need to use. Currently, it is not possible to
allow an extension only partial API access. To give the extensions lowest
possible privileges, current APIs would have to be redesigned.
It should not be possible to change the functionalities of already installed
extensions. One solution would be to create a hash for every extension hosted
on the official Mozilla’s extensions website. Every extension would include a
hash code, which would be compared to a corresponding hash in the Mozilla’s
server every time the browser is started. A secure protocol would be used to
compare the hashes. This solution would make the startup of the browser
a bit slower but would compensate it by guaranteeing that the extensions
downloaded from the official website can not be modified.
Extensions should not have the right to modify the content of an https
page. Users should always feel safe when browsing trusted and encrypted
web sites. The API should not allow the modification of DOM on sites that
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are using https. The downside of this would be the impossibility to use
extensions that modify DOM for blocking advertisements, as they are also a
part of the content of the page. This is a sacrifice the users would have to




Extension support for Windows platform was added to Google Chrome in
version 4.0. At the same time, extensions were enabled for Linux and since
version 5.0.307.7 extensions are available for Mac OS X 10.5 or newer re-
leases. In this chapter we analyse the extension model of Google Chrome
version 5.0.356. The analysis is applicable for all Google Chrome versions
that support extensions.
2.1 Overview of the extensions
Extensions are small programs that can modify and enhance the functional-
ity of Google Chrome. They can be written using technologies like HTML,
JavaScript, and CSS. Extensions are essentially web pages, and thus they
can use all the APIs that the browser provides to web pages, for example
XMLHttpRequest, JSON and HTML5 local storage. Extensions are allowed to
modify the user interface of Google Chrome by using browser actions or page
actions. Browser actions allow to put icons in the main Google Chrome tool-
bar. Page actions allow to put icons inside the address bar. Page actions
represent actions that can be run on the current page, but that are not appli-
cable to all pages. Extensions can interact with some browser features, such
as bookmarks and tabs. They can also interact with web pages or servers by
using content scripts or cross-origin XMLHttpRequests [GCO]. Extension’s
security architecture differs from the architecture of the plugins. Plugins are
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written using Netscape Plugin Application Programming Interface (NPAPI),
which is a cross-browser API for plugins. Each plugin is a binary that runs
in its own process, but the process is not sandboxed. This is because plugins
need to access the operating system. Google Chrome also supports binary
extensions. A NPAPI plugin can be bundled into an extension, which allows
to call into native binary code from JavaScript. Code running in an NPAPI
plugin has the full permissions of the current user and is not sandboxed or
shielded from malicious input by Google Chrome in any way [GCN].
2.2 High-level architecture
Until recently, web browsers could be compared to single-user, co-operatively
multi-tasked operating systems. In such an operating system a poorly de-
signed application or a hung process could bring the whole system to a halt.
Web browsers that use a single-process architecture face the same problems.
If a web browser runs all of its components in one process, then the crash
of one component can cause the crash of the whole browser. A misbehaving
web page, extension or a plugin can take down the entire browser and thus
all of the running tabs [GCA]. Google Chrome uses separate processes for
browser tabs to protect the overall application from bugs and glitches in the
rendering engine. It also restricts access from each rendering engine process
to other rendering engine processes and to the rest of the system. This brings
to web browsing the benefits similar to memory protection and access control
in operating systems.
A main process controls all other processes. This process runs the user
interface and manages the extension, plugin and rendering processes, see Fig-
ure 2.1. By default, each instance of a web page runs in its own renderer
process, which guarantees that web page is not able to modify the way an-
other web page behaves. Different subdomains are considered as a part of
the same web page to allow JavaScript access between the subdomains as
defined in the Same Origin Policy, see [GCP]. The number of renderer pro-
cesses is limited by the computer’s resources, the average limit is 20. If the
limit is reached then every succeeding tab will share a process with a ran-
domly chosen renderer process. This behavior somewhat weakens the process
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separation model, but the impact is not severe as the shared process will be
chosen randomly. The process limit can be avoided if a limited number of
tabs is used.
Chromium’s rendering engines are executed within a sandboxed process,
thus limiting access to the user’s computer. These sandboxed processes do
not have direct access to the user’s filesystem, display, or most other re-
sources. Therefore, if a rendering process gets compromised, it cannot com-
promise the computer. The sandboxed renderers can gain access to permitted
resources only through the browser process, which can impose security poli-
cies on this access. As a result, Chromium’s browser process can mitigate
the damage that an exploited rendering engine can do [GCP].
Figure 2.1: Google Chrome’s main process manages the other processes.
2.3 The security architecture of extensions
The security architecture gives to the extensions minimal required privileges
and restricts access to the file system. The idea is to limit the possible exploits
of an extension’s design that would allow a web page to take over the browser.
More precisely, every extension runs in a separate operating system process.
Such a process is isolated from the other operating system processes and
thus an extension cannot compromise the browser’s kernel. As every web
page runs in a sandboxed process, it is not easy for a malicious web site to
compromise an extension. Besides that, every extension contains a manifest
file named manifest.json which describes the extension’s privileges. This
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file is located in the user’s extensions folder and is therefore accessible without
administrative privileges. It is not digitally signed and thus can be modified.
The manifest file defines with which web sites the extension is allowed to
interact. The limited privileges will not allow an attacker to exploit the
security holes of an extension to access content it was not meant to use.
Every extension is divided into two basic blocks: content scripts and a
background page. Content scripts are files that run JavaScript in the context
of web pages. Background page is an invisible HTML page that runs in the
extension process and holds the main logic of the extension. For example, it
may contain a long-running script to manage some task or state, for further
details see [GCB]. In addition to a background page, an extension may
contain other HTML pages, for example a browser action can contain a
popup that is implemented by a HTML page.
The division into content scripts and background page is done to achieve
further privilege separation. Content scripts are allowed to interact di-
rectly with the web pages and to modify the DOM, but they cannot use
most of chrome.* APIs. In addition, content scripts cannot make cross-site
XMLHttpRequests and cannot use the variables or functions defined by web
pages, by other content scripts or extension pages. A content script that is
injected into a web page is not able to see any other JavaScript executing
on that page. The reverse also holds, JavaScript running on the same web
page cannot call any functions or access any variables defined by the content
script [GCC].
Background pages can use the chrome.* APIs, but are not allowed to
directly contact the web pages. Content script needs to communicate with
the background page in order to ask it to use the privileged APIs. Commu-
nication between extensions and content scrips is implemented by message
passing, see Figure 2.2. There is an API that provides the message pass-
ing capabilities. This implementation limits the content scripts privileges
while maintaining the functionalities of the extensions [GCM]. For example,
a content script is able to collect data from the DOM, but it needs to ask
the background page to use XMLHttpRequest to send this data to a remote
server.
Every extension package is forced to be signed by the creator and for that
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a unique key pair is assigned as the extension is packaged. This is done in
order to guarantee secure update process. A new version of the extension
must be signed with the assigned private key. Every extension contains an
update URL and the assigned public key in a manifest file, which is used to
verify the origin of the update. For that reason the update can be received
via an insecure connection. When Google Chrome checks for updates, it
will request a XML document from the update URL and make sure whether
the document refers to a newer version of the extension. If a newer version
is available, then the browser will download it and check if the extension
package is signed with the same private key as the current extension. If
the signature is correct, then the installation of the update will succeed.
However, this approach will not protect the installed extensions from being
modified. Thus, having access to the user’s profile folder will allow replacing
the update URL and the corresponding public key.
Figure 2.2: Content scripts and the background page communicate via mes-
sage passing.
2.3.1 Chrome’s memory space
In Google Chrome the memory of browser kernel, web pages, extensions and
plugins is isolated. The isolation is achieved through the use of different
processes, which are natively isolated from each other. The communication
between different processes is done by message passing. Every extension runs
in its own process and is therefore protected from other extensions. Thus,
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almost all of the extension’s code is separated from other processes, with the
exception of user scripts, which run in whichever renderers they apply to. The
extension process can be considered as a special type of renderer that controls
rendering of the various pieces of user interface, that an extension wishes to
add to the browser. The extension process is not able to interact with the
web page content directly, it has to inject user scripts into a web page and
then communicate with these scripts [GCE]. This means that the extension
is isolated from web content and cannot directly access the functions and
variables of a web page, therefore it is protecting itself from threats. An
extension is not able to directly access the variables or functions of another
process, including the main browser process. Thus, if an extension gets
hijacked, it cannot modify the way the browser or other extensions function.
2.3.2 Google Chrome’s code space
Google Chrome’s code space is not protected. It is possible to modify exten-
sion files and the preference files. These files are located in Google Chrome’s
user profile folder and thus accessing and modifying them does not require
administrative rights. We tested the possibility to overwrite the preferences
file and the extension files and found out that it was possible. Additional
content can be injected into the extension files, but to make all the changes
work the preferences file has to be modified first. This is because the pref-
erences file contains the copies of extension manifests and if the extension’s
manifest file was modified the preferences have to be changed similarly. In
order to modify the preferences file, the browser must not be running or the
default state will be restored after the browser is closed. Overwriting these
files and thus changing the functionality of the extensions required only user
privileges. Therefore, a third party application, which is running with lim-




2.4.1 Creating a keylogger
As Google Chrome’s extensions can use content scripts, it is trivial to write
a keylogger. In order to create a keylogger it should be possible to access
the user profile folder, which does not require administrative privileges. A
content script needs to listen for keystokes and save them. In order to do
that, special rights must be given to the content script in the manifest file,
to allow the content script to be injected into every web page. Because the
content script cannot use XMLHttpRequest to send data to a remote server,
it has to delegate the task to the background page. Message passing will
allow to send the saved keystrokes to the background page, which is able to
send the data to a remote server. We created this kind of a keylogger and
found out that the code can be copied into an already installed extension.
This can be dangerous, as the user will not be able to detect the change.
The code can be injected by a third party application or by someone who
has brief access to the computer.
2.4.2 Man in the browser attack
This attack is feasible if a compromised JavaScript can be installed to the
browser. This attack is based on the possibility to actively modify https
pages via DOM interface. As a result, a malicious extension could manipu-
late a bank’s web site or the web site of an e-mail service provider. First, the
extension would have to recognize the web page it will attack. This can be
done as the extension can query the URL of a web page. The attack would
begin when the user navigates to a https page listed in the extension. The
extension would already know the structure of these web pages. Thus, it
could recognize a frame or a web page, where user is required to fill forms.
In that page or frame the extension could inject an additional function to the
send button and collect and replace the data entered into the forms when the
send button is pressed. Thus, the extension could modify the DOM after the
modifications send the data to the server. The modification in the function-
alities of the send button is invisible to the user as the visible user interface
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does not change. To test our claim, we created an extension, which was able
to inject code into a https page and modify its DOM. The attacking extension
might also replace the DOM of the result page, but that might create a flicker
on the screen. A flicker might be noticeable because Google Chrome does
not support DOMContentLoaded event the way Firefox does. Namely, Google
Chrome may load images before the DOMContentLoaded event is fired.
Contrary to Firefox, it is possible to disable extensions in Google Chrome
during a browsing session. This can be done due to the isolated memory
of Chrome. For example, a button could be added to the user interface,
which would disable all extensions on the current web site. Chrome already
provides the possibility to choose on which web sites plugins are allowed and
this could also be extended to extensions. Currently it is possible to disable
one extension at a time from the extension manager, but not all extensions.
Also, it should be possible to create a list of web pages on which extensions
are automatically disabled, thereby guaranteeing the integrity of the web
page.
2.4.3 Using Google Chrome as a botnet
A Google Chrome’s extension could be used as a botnet client. The imple-
mentation would be a bit more difficult than in Firefox due to the content
script’s restrictions, but in principal the same. An extension could read the
commands from fixed web sites and then send spam by exploiting the possi-
bilities of XMLHttpRequest.
2.4.4 Risk assessment
• Critical - It is possible to run code with user privileges and without the
user’s knowledge.
• High - Access to confidential data and ability to inject data without
the user’s knowledge.
• Moderate - Access to sensitive information that does not expose the
user or organization to immediate risk.
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• Low - Leaks of non-sensitive information.
• DoS - Temporary denial of service attacks that may result in the crash
of the application.
Critical High Moderate Low DoS
Changing the functionalities x
JavaScript keylogger x
Man in the browser attack x
Botnet client x
Faulty extensions x
2.5 Ways for compromising Google Chrome
2.5.1 Installing a compromised extension
The easiest way to compromise the browser is to trick the user into installing
a compromised extension. This risk can be limited by providing signed and
verified extensions, but it is not possible to protect the user from third party
extensions that are not hosted in the Google’s extension gallery. Extensions
that have a binary NPAPI component are thoroughly tested by Google be-
fore they are allowed into the extensions gallery. This is necessary as binary
component are not sandboxed and have access to the file system. For that
reason, Google Chrome notifies the user about the potential security risk
when a binary extension is being installed. However, it is not possible to
protect the user after a malicious binary extension has been installed. In-
stalling an unknown binary extension is considered to be the user’s risk.
2.5.2 Modifying the installed extensions
It is possible to modify the source code of an installed JavaScript extension.
This makes it possible to hide malicious extensions from the user as they can
live inside another extension. The injected code will not break the original
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functionalities of the extension, which guarantees that the user will not notice
the change. Thus a third party application can add code to already existing
extensions in order to hide it’s behavior.
2.6 Solutions
Currently, there is no option on the user interface to disable all extensions
on certain web sites. This would be an important option, as the user could
be guaranteed that an extension has not changed the integrity of a web page.
There is a possibility to turn off the extensions by running Google Chrome
with the flag --disable-extensions, but this approach is not acceptable
for an average user.
Google Chrome does not notify the user, when an extension’s source
code has been modified and this allows the malicious code to be hidden.
Furthermore, it should not be possible to unnoticeably change the privileges
of an extension by modifying the manifest file. These vulnerabilities could be
disabled by digitally signing the extension’s files. The signature would have
to be recalculated every time an update is received, as it is the only time when
the extension’s files are modified. This would be computationally feasible.
Another solution would be to use a hash function to protect the whole code
tree. Hash function SHA-256 would be sufficient for the task. The code tree
could be hierarchically hashed and the top hash kept in a protected location,
which would be accessible only with administrative privileges.




Internet Explorer is a closed source browser that is developed by Microsoft.
The browser is built only for the Microsoft Windows operating systems. As
of April 2010, Internet Explorer holds 59.95% of web browsers market share
according to Net Applications, making it the most popular web browser [IES].
The statistics by Net Applications includes mobile browsing and is gathered
from a network of 40000 web sites over the world.
3.1 Overview of the extensions
Browser extensions, which were introduced in Microsoft Internet Explorer
5, allow to add functionality to the browser. Furthermore, extensions can
modify the user interface in a way that is not directly related to the viewable
content of web pages. The extensibility of the browser makes it possible for
the users to shape the browser according to their needs, for further details
see [IEE].
Internet Explorer’s extensions can be divided into the categories of browser
extensions and content extensions. Browser extensions can be used to add
additional functionality to the browser’s content. It includes features such
as shortcut menu extensions, custom toolbars, Explorer Bars, and Browser
Helper Objects (BHOs). Content extensions are used to extend the types of
content that can be parsed and displayed. ActiveX Controls and active docu-
ments are a part of content extensions [IEA]. For example, ActiveX Controls
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are used for running Flash and Microsoft Silverlight in Internet Explorer.
With BHOs it is possible to write components, that Internet Explorer
will load each time it starts up. Specifically, these components are in-process
Component Object Model (COM) components. These objects run in the
same memory context as the browser and can perform any action on the
available windows and modules. Such actions include detecting the browser’s
typical events like GoBack, GoForward and DocumentComplete; accessing
the browser’s menus and toolbars and modifying them [IEE]. Additionally,
a Browser Helper Object can create windows on the currently viewed page
and install hooks to monitor messages and actions [IEE]. This means that
it can modify the functionality of the browser by adding binary components.
A Browser Helper Object is a dll module that runs within Internet Explorer
and offers additional services.
ActiveX controls can be embedded into a web page and used as an ap-
plication. ActiveX control has full access to the operating system and thus
it can be used to spread malware. A web page can initialize the installation
process of the ActiveX control, which is a potential security threat. This is
called a Drive-By-Download. A page may ask the user to install a malware
extension by claiming it to be an useful plugin and trick the user to install it.
If the browser is running in protected mode then the installation will prompt
the user with a request to use administrator privileges.
3.2 High-level architecture
Internet Explorer architecture is based on a Component Object Model, a
binary-interface standard for software componentry introduced by Microsoft
in 1993. According to Microsoft Developer Network library the architecture
of Internet Explorer is divided into six modules [IEA].
• IExplore.exe is a small application that relies on the other main
components of Internet Explorer to do the work of rendering, nav-
igation, protocol implementation, and so on.
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• Browsui.dll is responsible for the user interface. This includes
the address bar, status bar, menus, and so on.
• Shdocvw.dll exposes ActiveX Control interfaces, provides nav-
igation functionality and history functionality. This component
can provide all the functionalities of the Internet Explorer except
the user interface.
• Mshtml.dll contains the Trident rendering engine. It is responsi-
ble for displaying web pages and handling the DOM.
• Urlmon.dll is responsible for handling Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) and download of web content.
• WinInet.dll handles all network communication over HTTP,
HTTPS and FTP.
In previous Internet Explorer versions tabs, BHOs, ActiveX controls and
toolbar extensions were running in the same process as the browser window.
This caused crashes and security problems as the memory space was shared.
Loosely-coupled Internet Explorer (LCIE) architecture was introduced in In-
ternet Explorer 8, see Figure 3.1. This architecture isolates the browser’s
frame and its tabs into different processes and allows to use The Windows
Vista Integrity Mechanism on a per-process basis. This means that it is pos-
sible to run tabs in a protected mode, while allowing exceptions. Therefore,
tabs can be run with different mandatory integrity levels (MIC) inside the
same browser window. Additionally, the browser kernel is isolated from the
tab processes, which execute scripts and extensions, therefore providing ad-
ditional protection for the browser kernel. The protected mode is designed to
prohibit write privileges but the confidentiality of the file system is not pro-
tected, as read access is not restricted. This also holds for Internet Explorer
7. By default, the possible number of Internet Explorer’s processes is limited
by the amount of available physical memory. Once the limit is reached then
the new tabs are forced to share a process with an already existing tab. The
limit may be changed manually by editing the value of TabProcGrowth in
the Windows registry. When compared to Google Chrome, which fixes a
process limit depending on the available physical memory, Internet Explorer
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determines when its tabs will share a process by using a context-based al-
gorithm. This algorithm uses the amount of installed physical memory to
calculate a pattern, which is used for creating new processes. Therefore, tabs
in Internet Explorer may share a process before the process limit is reached.
Figure 3.1: Loosely-coupled Internet Explorer architecture.
3.3 The security architecture of extensions
The core of the security architecture is based on the functionalities of Win-
dows Vista or newer versions of Windows. The architecture is based on
privilege separation and the ability to create processes with lower privileges.
It allows to run the browser with limited rights, which protects the com-
puter if the browser gets compromised. This approach is necessary, as the
extensions run with the same privileges as the browser.
In Windows Vista, IE 7 and IE8 run in protected mode, which helps
protect users from attack by running the Internet Explorer process with
greatly restricted privileges. Protected mode significantly reduces the ability
of an attacker to write, alter or destroy data on the user’s machine or to
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install malicious code [SB]. Protected mode uses the Windows Vista integrity
mechanism to run the Internet Explorer process at low integrity [SB].
Thus, if the browser or a tab runs in a protected mode a malicious ex-
tension does not have write access to the data on the file system that has a
higher integrity level. By default, all files and registry entries have medium
integrity level and thus Internet Explorer in protected mode does not have
write access to them. However, the protected mode does not deny read ac-
cess and because of that a malicious extension would still be able to read
the data with a higher integrity level. This could lead to a security breach,
as a malicious extension could gather sensitive information and send it to a
remote server.
The majority of the extensions are digitally signed, which guarantees that
the updates are not tampered with and come from an authentic source.
3.3.1 Internet Explorer’s memory space
Internet Explorer does not create new processes for extensions and plugins.
Extensions are loaded as the browser starts, but they run in the process
from which they are called. The level of memory isolation depends on the
amount of created tabs as the number of new processes is limited. As the
number of tabs grows, new web pages are forced to share the process with
other web pages. Thus, the extension called from shared memory space will
have direct access to the other web sites in that process. This is somewhat
different from Google Chrome’s behavior, as Chrome runs each extension in
a different process. In Internet Explorer an extension that runs in a shared
process is not able to directly access web pages that are located in other
processes. However, in Google Chrome an extension with proper privileges
may inject scripts to every open web site.
A low privilege process cannot compromise a higher privilege process.
This is achieved by User Interface Privilege Isolation (UIPI), which prevents
lower privilege processes from accessing higher privilege processes by block-
ing possibly dangerous behavior [UIP]. For example, it is not possible to
SendMessage or PostMessage to higher privilege application windows. This
is disabled because window messages cover a wide range of information and
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requests, including messages for mouse and keyboard input, dialog box input
and window creation and management [UIP]. Also, using hooks to attach
to a higher privilege process or to monitor a higher privilege process is not
allowed. These restrictions are used to protect the privileged applications
as a lower privileged process may not listen or modify their behavior. In
addition, a low privilege process cannot perform DLL injection to a higher
privilege process, as it would allow the lower privilege process to run code
with higher privileges.
3.3.2 Internet Explorer’s code space
Internet Explorer that is running in Windows Vista or a newer Windows
platform is by default running in protected mode. Thus, IE has write access
only to low integrity objects. These include the cookies folder, history folder,
temporary files folder and favorites folder. An extension that runs in pro-
tected mode can write only to certain subfolders of the previously mentioned
low integrity objects. For example, an extension can write to Temp\Low and
Cookies\Low. With those restrictions extensions are not able to write to sys-
tem locations such as the Program Files folder ,HKEY CLASSES ROOT or
HKEY LOCAL MACHINE subtrees. Also, extensions that try to gain write access
to the Internet Explorer binary files will receive access denied errors [SB].
Thus, extensions that run in protected mode are not able to compromise the
IE code space. Thereby, comparing to Firefox and Google Chrome, Inter-
net Explorer running in protected mode is able to prevent extensions from
modifying the code space.
3.4 Attack scenarios
3.4.1 Creating a keylogger
It is possible to write a BHO that logs keystrokes and monitors user’s be-
havior. By doing a quick search on Internet, we found several downloadable
BHO keyloggers and tutorials for creating them. As Internet Explorer does
not have a simple JavaScript based extension system it is somewhat harder
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to write a simple keylogger. For example, a BHO could save user’s keystrokes
in a temporary file that is accessible from the browser. The collected data
could be sent to a remote server, when enough information has been saved.
While it was possible for the user to read the source code of the Firefox’s
and Google Chrome’s JavaScript extensions, it is not possible in Internet
Explorer because the user has access to a compiled binary file. Thus, the
user cannot verify the functionalities of the BHO.
3.4.2 Website defacement
Website defacement cannot be done in an invisible way, like it is possible in
Firefox. In Firefox, JavaScript can interact with the DOM before the web
page has been displayed. In Internet Explorer, the state when the DOM has
been loaded but is not displayed cannot be detected, see Figure 3.2. That is
not possible because the scripts and media in Internet Explorer are loaded as
they are downloaded and do not wait until the DOM is finished. Thus a web
page would have to be loaded in order to modify the DOM and the user could
notice it. Besides that, to manipulate the DOM a binary plugin (BHO) would
have to written, which is more complex than writing a JavaScript extension.
Therefore the original DOM cannot be replaced by trivial methods.
Figure 3.2: This scheme shows how a web page is being loaded.
3.4.3 Man in the browser attack
Website defacement is feasible only if invisible elements are modified. Man in
the browser attack is an example of such a website defacement. This attack
is feasible if a compromised BHO can be installed on the computer. Thus,
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a previous infection is probably required for this attack to succeed. Man in
the Browser attack is similar to a man-in-the-middle attack but in this case
the malware is running inside the browser. A BHO is able to modify the
communication between the user and the server by replacing some parts in
DOM before a data packet is sent to the server.
For example, the compromised BHO could manipulate the information
in Internet banking transactions. The BHO contains a list of URL-s that
are being targeted and it compares these URL-s with the ones that the user
visits. The attack is initialized when the user navigates to a web page that is
in the targets list. The extension already knows the structure of the bank’s
web page and is able to recognize the transactions page. In the transactions
page the extension collects the data from the forms, as the send button is
clicked and replaces it in DOM. After the DOM is changed the extension calls
the function, which sends the modified information to the bank. For these
steps the functionality of the send button is changed by adding an additional
function to the DOM, when the transactions page has been loaded. This is
invisible to the user, as the visible user interface does not change. When the
bank sends a reply to confirm the transaction the extension replaces the false
data with the correct data in the reply’s DOM. The latter may be noticed by
the user, as the modification of the DOM might leave a flicker on the screen.
However, it is not likely that the user will understand what the flicker meant.
This attack is possible because the BHO is able to access and modify the
DOM of the web pages. It is also hard to avoid because the user passes all
the security checks before the transmission data is sent to the bank.
3.4.4 Risk assessment
• Critical - It is possible to run code with user privileges and without the
user’s knowledge.
• High - Access to confidential data and ability to inject data without
the user’s knowledge.
• Moderate - Access to sensitive information that does not expose the
user or organization to immediate risk.
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• Low - Leaks of non-sensitive information.
• DoS - Temporary denial of service attacks that may result in the crash
of the application.
Drive by Installing a Man in the browser Faulty






3.5 Ways for compromising Internet Expolorer
3.5.1 Installing a compromised extension
The risk of installing an unknown BHO or an ActiveX control equals the
risk of running an executable file. Thus, before installing an ActiveX control
the user should be warned of the threats. A compromised ActiveX could
be accidentally installed when a web site is initiating an installation. Also,
an ActiveX control may have security flaws that could allow the computer
to be compromised. For example, in July 2009 MPEG2TuneRequest ActiveX
control in msvidctl.dll in DirectShow allowed remote attackers to execute
arbitrary code via a crafted web page [CVE]. This was possible because
the msvidctl.dll contained a design flaw, which allowed stack-based buffer
overflow in the CComVariant::ReadFromStream function in the Active Tem-
plate Library (ATL) to be used to execute arbitrary code [CVE].
Many popular BHO extensions are not hosted on the official extensions
web site. These extensions are created by third party developers who might
have added malware to the BHO. For example, the user would probably not
notice a keylogger inside a binary that blocks advertisement.
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3.6 Solutions
Currently, the security architecture does not prevent a compromised exten-
sion from reading the data on the file system and sending this data to a
remote server. The extensions should not have read access to random files
on the file system. A solution for this would be to limit the read access and
force the extension to ask read access only to a specific location, when the
extension is installed. The extensions could have a file containing a list of
locations with read access and the user would see the list while the extension
is being installed.
A protection against threats arising from extensions can be achieved by
running Internet Explorer with all extensions disabled. Internet Explorer
will start without extensions if the user runs iexplore -extoff. With this
approach extensions are not loaded as the browser starts. If the browser was
started in normal mode, then the extensions are loaded, but they can be
disabled from the add-ons manager, which is located in the tools menu.
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Conclusive comparison
One of the biggest differences between these browsers is the fact that Google
Chrome and Firefox are built on open source code, while Internet Explorer’s
source code is not available. Therefore, the community of developers and
enthusiast are able to find security holes in Google Chrome and Firefox. As
Internet Explorer is based on closed source, it may hide security holes, which
the community is not able to find. When a severe vulnerability is found
in a browser, then usually a fast fix is provided in the next update. All
three browsers behave similarly when downloading updates for extensions.
The update is digitally signed and thus cannot be tampered with. However,
Google Chrome and Firefox get updates for their extensions from sources that
are defined by the extensions. Updateable extensions contain a manifest file
with an update URL and a public key, but the manifest file is not protected
from being modified. Thus, if the computer is already compromised, then
it is possible to change the source of the updates and replace the existing
public key, which is used for authenticating the update.
Memory space
When comparing the three browsers, Firefox is the only one without isolated
memory. Google Chrome and Internet Explorer both use additional processes
for rendering web content. They also isolate the browser’s kernel from the
extensions and web content, thereby protecting it from being compromised.
Contrary to Google Chrome and Internet Explorer, Firefox could be com-
promised by a malicious extension or by a specially crafted web page. As
Firefox currently follows a single process model, extensions are able to access
and modify the stack of a random thread inside the process. Firefox does
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not provide any isolation between extensions as an extension is able to mod-
ify the functionality of other extensions. In order to enhance security and
performance, a multi-process version of Firefox is currently being developed.
Code space
The architecture of Google Chrome’s extensions prevents a non-binary ex-
tension from accessing file system. Also, the sandboxed rendering processes
are denied read and write access to the file system. Internet Explorer sets
similar restrictions with the exception that read access is allowed. This priv-
ilege could lead to a leak of sensitive data if a browser containing malicious
extension is used for browsing. Unlike Google Chrome and Internet Explorer,
Firefox’s architecture gives JavaScript extensions read and write access to the
file system. Thus, a JavaScript extension is able to collect sensitive data from
the hard drive and publish it. Neither Firefox nor Google Chrome guaran-
tee that an already installed extension’s source files are not tampered with.
Both browsers are not able to detect an injection of a keylogger script into
installed extensions. Moreover, such an extension’s original functionalities







Paljud ta¨napa¨evased brauserid vo˜imaldavad funktsionaalsuse lisamist vo˜i
muutmist laienduste kaudu. Rohkete vo˜imaluste to˜ttu on laiendused muu-
tunud kasutajate hulgas populaarseks ja see on toonud kaasa uued ru¨ndevek-
torid, mis ohustavad kasutajate turvalisust. To¨o¨s analu¨u¨sime populaarsemate
veebibrauserite laienduste turvaarhitektuuri. Vaatleme Firefox 3.6, Google
Chrome 5.0.360 ja Internet Explorer 8 laienduste ehitust ja nende turval-
isust. To¨o¨ annab u¨levaate vastavate brauserite laienduste arhitektuurilisest
turvalisusest ja kirjeldab vo˜imalikke ru¨ndevektoreid. Selgitame, kuidas on
vastavate veebibrauserite koodiruum ja ma¨lu kaitstud ja teeme kindlaks mis-
suguseid o˜iguseid brauserite laiendused omavad. Uurime, kuidas on prae-
gust laienduste arhitektuuri kasutades vo˜imalik brausereid kompromiteerida
ja kirjeldame sellega kaasnevaid riske. Selleks demonstreerime laiendusi, mis
kompromiteerivad brauseri, na¨itamaks olemasoleva arhitektuuri puuduja¨a¨ke.
Na¨itame erinevaid ru¨ndevektoreid ja kirjeldame nendele vastavaid ru¨ndest-
senaariumeid. To¨o¨ tulemusena selguvad brauserite laienduste turvaarhitek-
tuuri no˜rkused. Nende leevendamiseks pakume va¨lja lahendusi, mis paran-
davad turvaarhitektuuri. To¨o¨ tulemusena on vo˜imalik brauserite kasutajaid
informeerida olemasolevatest ohtudest ja teadvustada turvalisuse olulisusest.
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Glossary
BHOs Browser Helper Objects are DLL modules designed for extending
Internet Explorer’s functionalities. Pages 36, 37, 38, 41, 42,
43, 44
COM Component Object Model is an architecture, allowing applications
to be built from binary software components. Page 37
CSS Cascading Style Sheets are used by Firefox’s and Google Chrome’s
extensions for creating browser themes. Page 26
DOM Document Object Model is a platform- and language-neutral inter-
face that allows programs and scripts to dynamically access
and update the content, structure and style of documents.
Pages 8, 15, 16, 18, 24, 29, 32, 33, 38, 42, 43
DoS Denial of Service is a type of an attack, which attempts to
make a computer resource unavailable to its intended users.
Pages 21, 22, 34, 44
Gecko An open source layout engine used in Mozilla Firefox.
Pages 6, 7, 14
JavaXPCOM A technology, which enables simple interoperation between
XPCOM and Java. Page 8
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LCIE Loosely-coupled Internet Explorer architecture isolates Internet
Explorer’s frame and its tabs into different processes. Page 38
MIC Mandatory Integrity Control is a security feature introduced in
Windows Vista, which adds integrity levels to processes. Page 38
NPAPI Netscape Plugin Application Programming Interface is a cross-
platform plugin architecture used in Firefox and Google Chrome.
Pages 27, 34
NSPR Netscape Portable Runtime provides platform independence for
threads, thread synchronization, file and network I/O and basic
memory management. Page 11
PyXPCOM A technology, which enables simple interoperation between
XPCOM and Python. Page 8
UIPI User Interface Privilege Isolation is a security feature that
was introduced in Windows Vista. It is used to prevent lower
privilege processes from accessing higher privilege processes.
Page 40
XPCOM A cross platform component object model that is used in Firefox.
Pages 7, 8, 10, 12
XPConnect A technology, which enables simple interoperation between
XPCOM and JavaScript. Pages 7, 8
XSS Cross-Site Scripting is a type of an attack, which allows
an attacker to inject unwanted code into a web site. Pages 22, 23
XUL XML User Interface Language, which is used in Firefox. Page 8
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